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People have been shown to engage in favor-trading when it is efficiency-enhancing to do so. 
Will they also trade favors when it reduces efficiency, as in a series of wasteful public projects 
that each benefits an individual? We introduce the “Stakeholder Public Bad” game to study this 
question. In each round, contributions to a common fund increase the earnings of one person (the 
“Stakeholder”) but reduce the earnings of the rest of the group so much that overall efficiency is 
reduced. The Stakeholder position rotates through members of the group and the promise of the 
high reward associated with this position may enable subjects to behave reciprocally. We 
hypothesize that some people will help a current Stakeholder by contributing in hopes of being 
rewarded later with a reciprocal gift. In a lab experiment, we find evidence of such favor trading. 
We also find that Stakeholders in this situation seem perfectly willing to sacrifice the good of the 
group to reap their own personal rewards, and this is true even when their contribution decisions 
are public. While the revelation of information about others’ actions and roles has previously 
been shown to enable efficiency-increasing reciprocity, we show that it also enables efficiency-
decreasing reciprocal acts. Subjects who are more risk-averse behave in a way that is more 
myopically self-interested as compared to less risk-averse people when information conditions 
preclude favor trading, and subjects who identify with the Democratic Party show more restraint 
when they are Stakeholder than those who do not. 
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1.  Introduction 
Members of a group must frequently decide on the provision of a project that has both 
winners and losers. A defense contract may benefit one constituency while incurring large tax-
funded expenses; a factory siting decision brings jobs to one area but may have environmental 
consequences; an appropriations bill may fund wasteful “bridges to nowhere” to the benefit of 
individual committee members. Further, many decisions of this kind occur as repeated games in 
which different agents have stakes in different projects. This structure may give rise to reciprocal 
behavior: you support my project and I’ll support yours. Existing evidence shows that this 
trading may work for pro-social projects. Does the same dynamic occur when projects are 
overall anti-social—when the harms they cause are greater than the benefits they generate? In a 
more general sense, can reciprocity, a force championed for pro-sociality in settings from 
interpersonal interactions to the macroeconomy to evolution, be destructive? 
We study this question using a model that allows strategic or other-regarding reciprocal 
behavior to enter into a group’s provision of a common project with heterogeneous costs and 
benefits. We create a game called the “Stakeholder Public Bad” game. In each round, members 
of a group decide how much to contribute to a common fund. The common fund contributions 
determine the provision of an overall efficiency-reducing project in which one member has a 
stake (i.e., is directly compensated) while the other members’ payoffs are reduced by project 
provision. This Stakeholder role rotates so that each group member will eventually be the 
beneficiary from the project. In some settings, public information makes reciprocal acts possible, 
but in others information is hidden so that reciprocal behavior is impossible. How people behave 
in these settings depends crucially on whether they have social preferences (and if so, what kind) 
and what their expectations are for reciprocation by others. 2 
 
In a lab experiment implementing this model, we find evidence of anti-social reciprocal 
behavior. We also find that subjects contribute nearly fully in the role of Stakeholder regardless 
of the information condition, even though this is an anti-social act. More risk-averse subjects 
behave in a more myopically self-interested way (as compared to less risk-averse subjects) when 
information conditions preclude favor trading, and subjects who identify with the Democratic 
Party show more restraint as Stakeholder than do non-Democrats.  
2.  Favor-Trading in Public Good and Public Bad Provision 
Agents’ behavior in a public bad game with rotating high return has, to our knowledge, 
not yet been studied. The literature on public goods is extensive (useful surveys of which include 
Chaudhuri, 2011; Ledyard, 1995). A major lesson from that literature is that experimental 
subjects contribute much more than selfish rational models predict. Suggested motives for this 
cooperation include altruism (e.g., Marwell and Ames, 1981) and conditional cooperation 
(Gächter, 2007). Many institutions for project provision have been examined, the most relevant 
of which is the linear voluntary contributions mechanism game in which individuals’ 
contributions to the common fund have constant returns to each member of the group. This game 
is the basis for our Stakeholder Public Bad game. 
Projects that reduce overall efficiency have received less attention. This is in part because 
many models treat public bads as dual to public goods. For example, one can argue that 
preferences against (the public bad of) pollution are the same as preferences for (the public good 
of) pollution abatement. The theoretical and experimental literatures agree that treating bads as 
isomorphic to goods causes problems, however. First, because the Nash equilibrium can lead to 
unbounded amounts of a public bad, it is unclear how the dual of a public good is to be treated 
theoretically (Shitovitz and Spiegel, 2003). Second, due to systematic differences in the way 3 
 
people respond to goods and bads, cooperation and individual decisions differ based on the 
framing of isomorphic conditions. Schwartz-Shea (1983), Andreoni (1995), and Sonnemans et 
al. (1998) demonstrate that people are more pro-social under a public goods framing than a 
public bad framing. Barr and Serra (2009, 2010) have studied corruption in the lab as an 
implementation of public bads (in which the briber and the bribed benefit, but others bear costs) 
and find a surprising amount of engagement in antisocial acts, but also show that less bribery 
occurs when the negative externality is higher and that internalized social norms have some 
effect on behavior. When moves are sequential, Moxnes and van der Heijden find that subjects 
will show more restraint following a “leader” (first-mover) who contributes less to a public bad 
(Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003) and that such leaders tend to contribute less than followers 
do (van der Heijden and Moxnes, 2003). This leadership differs importantly, however, from our 
concept of a project Stakeholder who receives large benefits from the project. 
Reciprocity has been shown to be important in pro-social settings in general, and 
reciprocal acts are central to our model. Sobel (2005) provides a useful discussion of the related 
literature. He classifies “instrumental reciprocity” as favor-trading rooted in other-regarding 
preferences, as opposed to “intrinsic reciprocity” which is favor-trading that is simply strategic in 
the sense of seeking a future reward. This literature includes theoretical development (e.g., Cox 
et al., 2008; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993; Wilson, 2008) and experimental 
evidence (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Cox, 2004; Fehr et al., 1993; List, 
2006).  
Reciprocal behavior in the form of conditional cooperation is important in public good 
games (Gächter, 2007). However, information conditions and payoff asymmetries can provide 
additional leverage for reciprocity of all types within a group provision setting. Information 4 
 
provision alone may increase giving (e.g., Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Sell and Wilson, 1991). 
But information is also a lever for reciprocity since it is impossible to reciprocate without 
knowing who has been kind to you (Wilson, 2008). Asymmetric returns have mostly been 
studied to look at either responsiveness to returns to self and others (e.g., Goeree et al., 2002), or 
to look at leadership (e.g., Brandts et al., 2007; Glöckner et al., 2011), sometimes in the spirit of 
Olson’s (1965) “privileged groups” (Reuben and Riedl, 2009). Jacobson and Petrie (2011), quite 
relevantly, demonstrated that other-regarding preference-based (intrinsic) reciprocity can boost 
public good provision given rotating payoff asymmetry and sufficient information. Isaac et al. 
(2011) study common projects which benefit some people and hurt others, and find that people 
who have negative returns give less to project provision and will even pay to reduce provision.
2 
Isaac et al. (2011) do not investigate the possibility of a rotating position of privilege as we do. 
We extend the existing literature by examining reciprocal acts in a project provision 
setting where the common project is anti-social. We do not seek the kind of “negative 
reciprocity” (also known as spite) examined in work like Abbink et al. (2000), where reciprocal 
preferences cause people to reduce each other’s payoffs through punishment. In such settings, 
negative reciprocity is actually socially positive because it encourages and enforces norms of 
trust and reciprocity. In our setting, reciprocal acts are socially harmful. 
Our work is also related to the logrolling literature in which politicians who pursue their 
own constituencies’ interests support each other’s projects (Buchanan and Tullock, 1966). This 
literature has focused primarily on voting mechanisms and coalition formation (Miller, 1977; 
Shubik and Van der Heyden, 1978; Tullock, 1970; Walker et al., 2000). In many cases, the 
literature has found or assumed that vote-trading and logrolling increase efficiency (Buchanan 
                                                 
2 Separate work examines behavior when the project affects people with no power to decide on provision of 
the project, e.g., “bystanders” in Engel and Rockenbach (2011) and “outsiders” in Delaney and Jacobson (2011). 5 
 
and Tullock, 1966; Walker et al., 2000). However, instances of a small number of jurisdictions 
with extreme preferences for a project with large but distributed costs abound, such as in the case 
of ethanol policy (Holland et al., 2011). Our study could be compared to political logrolling in 
which agents support bills that benefit their own district but are wasteful uses of taxpayer money. 
The linear nature of provision in our model reflects a kind of support that varies continuously, 
such as lobbying or support in drafting of favorable legislation or influence peddling, rather than 
discrete support such as voting. As a result, our model demonstrates a novel way for logrolling-
type behavior to occur using trading of continuous support rather than formation of coalitions. 
3.  Model 
We model a “Stakeholder Public Bad” game. In this game, members of a group make 
repeated simultaneous individual decisions to contribute to a common fund. These contributions 
generate a public project with asymmetric returns: some group members benefit from provision 
while others are hurt, and the socially optimal level of provision is zero. One can interpret 
contributions in this setting as either public bad provision or common pool resource extraction.  
Agents belong to groups of size N. Group membership is fixed for a series of periods. 
Each member has an endowment of   tokens each period to allocate between a private fund and a 
common fund. The private fund represents the opportunity cost of support for the common fund 
and provides a return of  0 a  per token not contributed. Agent i earns return  it b  to for every 
token contributed by any group member to the common fund. This return varies across roles and 
may be negative for some group members. Each agent also earns a role-specific baseline return 
from the “status quo” (no contributions) level of public project provision:  it G .
3  
                                                 
3 This fixed status quo can be compared to Isaac et al. (2011)  who instead model agents who can choose to 
contribute to an “alternative” version of the public project, which action actually reduces project provision. 6 
 
Agent i’s payoff in period t is given by: 
 
1...
it it it jt it
jN
G b g a z g 


    
    
In each period t, agents are exogenously assigned roles. The values of  it G  and  it b  vary 
according to agent i’s role in period t. Each agent then chooses his contribution  it g . The simple 
net return to   for any token he contributes to the public fund is  it ba  .  
In each period, one member of the group has the role of Stakeholder (role S if 
t Stakeholder i  ). The Stakeholder benefits enough from the common project to overcome his 
opportunity cost: the Stakeholder return from the common fund is  0 S ba , thus making this a 
privileged group (Olson, 1965). The Stakeholder role rotates through all group members from 
period to period.
4 
The remaining  1 N  group members in each period are Non-Stakeholders (role NS if 
t Stakeholder i  ). Non-Stakeholders prefer the status quo to positive project provision; their per-





    if 
 if 
S S jt it t
jN
it
NS NS jt it t
jN
G b g a z g Stakeholder i





     
   




This project is a public bad if the total return from a token contributed is negative. This 
happens if the total losses of Non-Stakeholders are larger than the gains of Stakeholders. Thus, 
the project is a public bad if    1 S NS b N b a    , or, given that  0 NS b  , if    1 S NS b N b  . 
                                                 
4 It is worth noting that in some situations, a Stakeholder in a potential project that would be anti-social 
may be able to (in addition to withholding his own contributions) “bury” his project so that no-one has opportunity 
to contribute. In some situations, however, a Stakeholder may have no such power. 7 
 
Since payoffs are linear in own-contribution, each role has a simple dominant strategy if 
all agents are rational and self-regarding: Stakeholders contribute fully to the common fund and 
Non-Stakeholders contribute nothing.  
If agents are other-regarding, they may face a dilemma. If they contribute, they help one 
member of the group quite a bit but hurt others and overall reduce efficiency. Altruism may 
cause Stakeholders to reduce their privately beneficial but socially harmful contributions to the 
common fund. Altruistic Non-Stakeholders generally should not contribute to the common fund 
unless they have preferences that privilege the current Stakeholder above other group members. 
If agents have reciprocal preferences, group members may use the rotating Stakeholder 
position to alternately “help” each other. Imagine that in three sequential periods, first Adam is 
Stakeholder, then Beatrice, then Cynthia. Imagine further that in the first period, Beatrice 
contributed a large amount while Cynthia contributed nothing. Beatrice’s contribution was 
personally costly in that she sacrificed her own payoff to increase Adam’s. Cynthia made no 
such sacrifice. If Adam is a reciprocator, he may let these acts affect his contributions in the 
following periods. He may contribute a large amount when Beatrice is Stakeholder and less 
when Cynthia is Stakeholder.  
If agents have truly reciprocal other-regarding preferences (“intrinsic reciprocity”), this 
discrimination happens because Adam’s preferences for Beatrice’s and Cynthia’s payoffs were 
changed by their previously kind and unkind, respectively, acts. On the other hand, this 
reciprocation could be wholly instrumental. If Adam is self-regarding but believes other agents 
may be reciprocators, he might hope to earn future rewards by strategically contributing when a 
likely reciprocator is Stakeholder. He might guess from her past generosity that Beatrice is 
reciprocator. He could then mimic a reciprocating type in pursuit of a higher payoff. If there is 8 
 
common knowledge that no-one is a reciprocator and everyone is fully forward-looking, then this 
kind of “cooperation” would wholly unravel. If agents are fully self-interested but myopic the 
unraveling might be incomplete and might generate early strategic contributions. Relatedly, one 
might be tempted to think that Non-Stakeholders will contribute because of conditional 
cooperation, trying to lead others to also contribute or responding to others’ earlier contributions. 
While targeted reciprocity (person-to-person favor-trading) is plausible, conditional 
contributions to spur or respond to contributions by the group at large are unlikely because an 
increased group tendency to contribute in all rounds would reduce all agents’ earnings. 
Even Stakeholder contributions could be affected by intrinsic or instrumental reciprocity. 
A Stakeholder who wishes to earn higher contributions in future Stakeholder stints or to reward 
the kindness of past benefactors may reduce his common fund contributions now since those 
contributions hurt all of his group members. 
Reciprocity requires that agents observe each other’s history of actions and schedule of 
Stakeholder timing. If history or roles are not observable, reciprocity in the sense of targeted 
rewards for individuals’ past actions cannot influence contributions. We model two information 
conditions. In the Public condition, all group members know one another’s contribution history 
and one another’s roles in each period. In the Private condition, group members know only their 
own role and history; they learn the individual amounts contributed in past periods but cannot 
associate them with any particular group member and know nothing about the timing of others’ 
Stakeholder stints. 
If agents are inequity-averse, how should they behave? It depends on their expectations 
of others’ actions. Since the Stakeholder role rotates through all group members, if other agents 
contribute as Stakeholder and withhold when they are Non-Stakeholder, then an inequity-averse 9 
 
agent should do the same to ensure equal payoffs. If group members deviate from that pattern, an 
inequity-averse agent should match that deviation. 
To summarize, in the Private information condition, there is little reason for Non-
Stakeholders with any kind of preference to contribute so Non-Stakeholder contributions in this 
setting are at some baseline level near zero. In the Public condition, Non-Stakeholder 
contributions could be increased because of targeted reciprocity. If Non-Stakeholders reduce 
contributions (relative to the baseline) to previously unkind Stakeholders, however, these forces 
may offset one another so that the effect on Non-Stakeholder contributions of Public information 
is ambiguous. Regardless, direct favor-trading as described in the example above can occur in 
the Public condition only. Stakeholder contributions may be reduced in the Public as compared 
to the Private condition because of reciprocity. 
Other elements of preferences may affect behavior. Trusting is a risky choice because one 
cannot be certain that the other group member will reciprocate a kind act. As a result, we expect 
that risk preferences would be correlated with contribution behavior in this setting. Agents who 
contribute as Non-Stakeholders in the Private information condition are taking a particular risk, 
since other agents cannot directly reciprocate. Beliefs about how individuals and groups relate to 
each other, and thus political preferences, could also play a role. People with beliefs that 
privilege social duties should contribute less in all roles. 
4.  Experiment 
To test the model and study the operative preferences, we implement the Stakeholder 
Public Bad game in a lab experiment based on a linear public bad game with rotating asymmetric 
payoffs. We use two treatments corresponding to the Private and Public information conditions, 
which we describe in detail below.  10 
 
In each treatment, subjects are randomly assigned to fixed four-person groups for eight 
rounds. In each round, each subject is endowed with  10 z   tokens. He then must choose how 
many tokens (   1, ,10 it g  ) to invest in a Group Fund, while the remaining tokens are kept in 
a Personal Fund. Each group has one Stakeholder and three Non-Stakeholders in each round. The 
Stakeholder role rotates through all members of each group so that each subject is Stakeholder 
twice and Non-Stakeholder six times in each eight-round treatment. 
The per-token payoff from the Personal Fund is  $0.02 a  for all group members. For 
Stakeholders, the Group Fund yields no base payment ( 0 S G  ) but the per-token payoff from 
the Group Fund is  $0.10 S b  . In round t, the Stakeholder who contributes  it g  earns: 
  : $0.10 $0.02 10 $0.20 $0.08 $0.10 t it jt it it jt
j j i
Stakeholder i g g g g 

         
For Non-Stakeholders, the Group Fund pays a base payment of  $2.00 NS G  . This base 
payment ensures that Non-Stakeholders can never earn a negative amount in any round; the 
Stakeholder base payment  S G  is zero because this concern does not exist for them. This is 
reduced by  $0.05 NS b   per token in the Group Fund. If Non-Stakeholder subject i contributes 
it g  in round t, his payoff is: 
  : $2.00 $0.05 $0.02 10 $2.20 $0.07 $0.05 t it jt it it jt
j j i
Stakeholder i g g g g 

          
Given these parameters, the net marginal social return to each token in the Group Fund is 
$0.08 3*$0.05 $0.07    (or  $0.09  , if the $0.02 opportunity cost is considered). If all subjects 
are purely self-regarding and myopic, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium in each round: 
Stakeholders contribute fully and Non-Stakeholders do not contribute, so that the total group 
investment is 10 and the Stakeholder earns $1.00 and the Non-Stakeholders earn $1.70. The total 11 
 
group payoff is then $6.10. The socially optimal outcome is for no tokens to be invested in the 
Group Fund, in which case  $0.20 S    and  $2.20 NS   , and total group earnings are $6.80. If 
all agents contribute all tokens, the total group investment is 40,  $4.00 S   ,  $0.00 NS   , and 
total group earnings are $4.00. 
In the Public information condition, each subject is assigned a letter code. Subjects see a 
table in which the timing of Stakeholder position for all group members is reported and in which 
each group member’s contribution history is displayed. In the Private condition, subjects’ 
contributions to the Group Fund are reported in a disaggregated list (it has been noted, e.g., Sell 
and Wilson, 1991, that disaggregated reporting of group member contributions may affect 
giving). Because contributions are listed in a random order that is reshuffled each round, norms 
may be established and subjects may follow each other. However, reputations cannot be 
established and Stakeholder timing is private information so targeted reciprocity is impossible. 
The experiment interface is computerized using software written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). Subjects enter the lab and are given general instructions.
5 They are told that they will 
make decisions in two sets of eight rounds with two different groups and that they will then 
make one unrelated decision, but are not told the exact nature of the decisions they will make in 
each treatment until directly before the treatment begins.  
The first treatment begins with instructions that explain the roles and the information 
condition for that treatment. The software randomly assigns subjects into four-person groups. 
The subjects then play through all of the rounds for the treatment. After the first treatment, 
subjects are randomly assigned into new four-person groups. The second treatment features the 
complementary information condition and proceeds in much the same way, with treatment-
                                                 
5 Instructions are available on the corresponding author’s website: http://econ.williams.edu/people/saj2 12 
 
specific instructions read first. After both treatments are complete, subjects receive instructions 
for a risk preference elicitation task (similar to Holt and Laury, 2002). After the risk task, 
subjects complete a questionnaire and receive payment anonymously. Each subject’s total 
earnings is the sum of his earnings in each treatment, which in turn are the sum of his earnings in 
each round plus his earnings from the risk task.  
5.  Results 
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN) at Georgia 
State University in March 2010 in four separate 20-subject sessions, for a total of 80 subjects. All 
subjects played two treatments of eight rounds, one in a Public and one in a Private information 
condition. Half of the sessions ran the Public treatment first, and half ran the Private treatment 
first. Some small order effects are detectable, so all analysis includes only data from subjects’ 
first treatment.
6 The protocol was double anonymous: subjects could not identify which subjects 
were in their group, and the experimenters could not identify which subject made any set of 
decisions. Of the 80 subjects, 40 (50%) were female, and the average age was 20.1. Each session 
lasted about 90 minutes, and subjects earned on average $23.38 (standard deviation $1.85). 
Contribution Level Results 
Figure 1 shows the path of contribution decisions across the rounds of each treatment. 
Stakeholder decisions in both treatments are close to the endowment, which is consistent with 
the selfish dominant strategy of full contribution by Stakeholders. Non-Stakeholder contributions 
                                                 
6 Order effects are: Non-Stakeholder contributions are higher in a subject’s first treatment; and Stakeholder 
contributions are higher in both conditions if the Private treatment is first. Results change little when the full data set 
is used: Stakeholder contributions are significantly greater in the Public than in the Private treatment; and the 
difference-in-difference test comparing favor-trading between the Public and Private treatments is significant. 13 
 
are low but positive in all rounds. Contributions show the downward trend usually seen in public 
goods games, even though this public investment is actually a public bad.
7  
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the distribution of individual contributions across 
rounds. The majority of contributions follow the selfish dominant strategy, but many subjects 
deviate from perfect adherence. In particular, Non-Stakeholders seem to have a greater tendency 
to give nonzero amounts than do Stakeholders tend to give less than full endowment. 
We compare means of contributions by role and treatment in Table 2. Both Stakeholders 
and Non-Stakeholders contribute slightly less in the Public treatment as compared to the Private 
treatment, but this is not significant. It must be the case, then, either that reciprocity is not 
playing a large role here or that subjects’ increased contributions to kind Stakeholders are offset 
by decreased contributions to unkind Stakeholders. In the next section we present evidence that 
reciprocity does indeed occur in the Public treatment, which implies the latter interpretation. 
Total (combined across roles) group contributions do not differ between the Public and 
Private conditions. Figure 2 shows that the trend across periods for the two treatments. Across-
round average total contribution is 41.77% of the maximum total group contribution as compared 
to 40% of the maximum in the Public treatment, and these numbers are not statistically different 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test p-value 0.626).  
Because of the novel structure of induced preferences, it is difficult to compare 
contributions in this experiment to contributions in other experiments. In Jacobson and Petrie 
(2011), with a similar asymmetric payoff setup but a public good instead of a public bad, 
Stakeholders gave slightly more than they do here (95-97% of endowment), Non-Stakeholders 
gave much more than they do here (33-38%), and both roles show trends similar to the trends 
                                                 
7 Obviously, interpretation of our results depends on the assumption that subjects understand the game they 
are playing and in particular understand the public bad nature of the common fund. While it is impossible to prove 
this with any certainty, we find at least some questionnaire responses to imply an understanding of this feature. 14 
 
shown here. This reduction in contributions is clearly due to the public bad nature of the public 
project in the Stakeholder Public Bad game as compared to the public good nature of the public 
project in Jacobson and Petrie (2011). Indeed, we find it remarkable that subjects give as much 
as they do in this public bad setting. In particular, Stakeholders’ willingness to purely follow 
self-interest to the detriment of their group appears to be uninhibited by social preferences.  
Presence of Reciprocal Contribution 
Reciprocal contributions may be caused by intrinsic or instrumental reciprocity. We test 
for reciprocity by comparing how much a Non-Stakeholder contributes in two different 
conditions. The first condition is that the Non-Stakeholder is facing a Stakeholder who 
contributed generously (more than half his endowment) in the period in which this person was 
Stakeholder. The alternative condition is that the Non-Stakeholder is facing a Stakeholder who 
contributed ungenerously (less than half of his endowment) when this person was Stakeholder.
8  
As shown in Table 3, we test whether subjects discriminate between these generous and 
ungenerous Stakeholders in both the Private and Public treatments. Recall that the reciprocity is 
impossible in the Private treatment, and indeed we do not detect spurious evidence of reciprocity. 
However, in the Public treatment, the data show that Non-Stakeholders do respond to the current 
Stakeholder’s past kindness, i.e., they reciprocate: they contribute more when the current 
Stakeholder was previously generous than when he was previously ungenerous. This test is 
within-subject and is thus robust to group-level correlation of contributions. However, the 
within-subject nature of the test greatly reduces the sample size because most people do not face 
                                                 
8 The results that follow hold qualitatively for alternative specifications of the threshold for generosity. 15 
 
both a previously-kind and previously-unkind Stakeholder.
9  Even so, some subjects’ tendency to 
discriminate seems quite strong. If we perform a difference-in-difference test for the difference 
in this sort of discrimination across the Private and Public treatments, the result is not significant 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value 0.241), but this is clearly due to reduced sample size. The evidence 
of significant discrimination in the Public treatment demonstrates reciprocal giving. 
We note that that anti-social favor-trading, which is clearly a socially bad activity, is 
enabled by the provision of information on subjects’ histories and the timing of their interest in 
the common fund. Thus in this case, reciprocity and the information that enables it serve as a 
force for evil. We contrast this with the result in Jacobson and Petrie (2011), who show that 
providing information that allows reciprocity in a similar game (a “Stakeholder Public Good” 
rather than a “Stakeholder Public Bad” game) increases efficiency by leveraging pro-social 
favor-trading. 
Correlates of behavior 
Final insights into contribution behavior come from subjects’ questionnaire responses. It 
should be noted that the questionnaire could not have primed subjects, since it was filled out 
after the experiment decisions were complete. Characteristics that vary with contribution 
decisions are described in Table 4. 
First, we see that subjects who identify with the Democratic Party tend to give less as 
Stakeholders in the Public treatment as compared to subjects who do not identify with that party. 
In the Private treatment the same pattern exists but is not statistically significant (Democrats give 
89.71 as compared to 96.74 percent of endowment, Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value 0.122). This 
                                                 
9 Each subject experiences only 3-6 rounds after his first Stakeholder stint. Since the majority of Non-
Stakeholder contributions are zero in both treatments, is it not surprising that fairly few subjects face both types of 
Stakeholders after their first Stakeholder stint in this small number of rounds. 16 
 
accords with the results from other social sciences that Democrats are more oriented toward 
duties toward society and a feeling of obligation to help others (Coffé and Bolzendahl, 2011).
10 
Next, we look at risk aversion as measured by a subject’s switch point in the Holt-Laury 
(2002) style lottery choice instrument. An early switch point indicates that the person is less risk-
averse. We consider those who are risk-seeking to mildly risk-averse as one group and compare 
their contributions to those of the more risk-averse subjects.
11 Less risk-averse subjects give 
more as Non-Stakeholder and less as Stakeholder than more risk-averse subjects do in the Private 
treatment. This implies a positive relationship between risk aversion and adherence to the selfish 
dominant strategy. This is sensible if we recall that there’s no clear way for non-dominant giving 
in the Private condition to be rewarded, while non-dominant giving in the Public condition can 
be associated with targeted reciprocity. While we do not have direct evidence that cooperating in 
the Public condition is less risky, we find it reasonable to infer that trusting to the group in 
general to reward sacrifice (as must happen in the Private treatment) feels riskier than does 
trusting to a specific group member (as is possible in the Public treatment). 
Finally, we included a simple comprehension test in the questionnaire. This gave a simple 
scenario with two funds with different returns, and asked the subject how many tokens he’d put 
into the fund with the higher return to maximize his profit. Out of the 80 subjects in the 
experiment, 68 (85%) answered this question correctly. A tendency to make non-dominant 
contributions—to contribute high amounts as Non-Stakeholder and to contribute low amounts as 
Stakeholder—is correlated with tendency to answer this comprehension question incorrectly.
12 
                                                 
10 Subjects who identify as black are more likely to identify as Democrats, as are subjects who have not 
taken economics classes. Stakeholder contributions do not vary significantly by whether a subject has taken 
economics classes. Black subjects do give less as Stakeholder in the Public treatment, but not the Private treatment. 
11 This result is robust to other thresholds of the “more risk-averse” classification. 
12 Subjects who answered the comprehension question incorrectly were much more likely to have reported 
taking no economics classes. 17 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine reciprocal behavior in the provision of a public bad. 
Individuals may have competing motivations when a group of people must decide on the 
provision of a common project. We model sequences of inefficient projects, each of which is 
nonetheless privately desirable to a booster within the group. Natural analogies include political 
logrolling or influence peddling. Reciprocity has been shown to be a force for social good in 
many settings; our results show that it can also cause social harm. 
We use a novel “Stakeholder Public Bad” model in which asymmetric returns create a 
public bad that is privately beneficial to a single constituent. In our model, we show that intrinsic 
or instrumental reciprocity could lead to favor-trading in the provision of these projects and that 
overall provision could be increased by reciprocity given this structure of payoffs if sufficient 
information is available to agents. In an experiment implementing this model, we find that some 
subjects discover the opportunity to trade favors and actively engage in this favor-trading when 
they have the necessary information. In this context, reciprocal behavior does not increase the 
level of public bad provision. Given the existence of reciprocity, however, overall public bad 
provision might increase or decrease under different parameters or with a different subject pool. 
In this way, reciprocity may in some situations reduce efficiency. On a related note, 
provision of information in this context enables this anti-social reciprocal behavior—this again 
can be contrasted with the perhaps more common case in which information provision increases 
efficiency. This potential for misuse of information is clearly noticed by some attempting to 
reform campaign finance in the United States. Ackerman and Ayres (2002) argue that all 
campaign contributions should be anonymous to render political favor-trading impossible. 18 
 
Beyond an overall tendency to engage in reciprocity, we also observe how people behave 
when a privately optimal decision actively hurts others. We argue that this is a subtly but 
fundamentally different issue than people’s failure to provide a public good. When subjects 
benefit directly from a public bad, as in our Stakeholder role, we see that they contribute nearly 
fully. Even some subjects who bear a private cost from the public bad (Non-Stakeholders) 
contribute a positive amount to the public bad. Although some of this may be due to subject 
error, some of it is clearly caused by subjects’ hopes of garnering future rewards when their “pet 
project” is the one being provided (i.e., when they are Stakeholder). Risk aversion seems to 
inhibit some subjects’ Non-Stakeholder contributions when a reward for such action seems 
unlikely to be forthcoming. Subjects who identify as Democrats quite significantly restrain their 
contributions to project provision as compared to subjects who do not, and this may be caused by 
differences in attitudes about how the individual relates to the group. 
The direct rewards reaped by a person with a stake in a common project appear to be so 
tempting that they can overwhelm a person’s inherent social preferences. Despite the negative 
social effects of provision of the public bad, subjects from both roles contribute positively to the 
provision of the public bad to their mutual detriment. Altruism and pro-social reciprocity are real 
and have been proven repeatedly. In this setting, however, individuals are able to harness 
reciprocity and information as a force for the good of the few but against the good of the many. 
 
   19 
 
7.  Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Contributions across rounds by role and treatment (in percent of endowment) 
 
 
Table 1: Distribution of contribution amounts by treatment and role 
  Non-Stakeholder  Stakeholder 
  Private  Public  Private  Public 
Gave 0% of endowment
a  161 (67.08%)  140 (58.33%)  3 (3.75%)  2 (2.5%) 
Gave intermediate amount
a  60 (25%)  86 (35.83%)  8 (10%)  12 (15%) 
Gave 100% of endowment
a  19 (7.92%)  14 (5.83%)  69 (86.25%)  66 (82.5%) 
Median contribution  0  0  Endowment  Endowment 
Subjects who always follow 
selfish dominant strategy
b 
13 (32.5%)  14 (35%)  29 (72.5%)  27 (67.5%) 
Number of contributions  240  240  80  80 
Number of subjects  40  40  40  40 
a Cells contain number of contributions with percent of contributions in parentheses. 
b Selfish dominant strategy is to contribute 0 as Non-Stakeholder and 100% of endowment as Stakeholder. 20 
 
 
Table 2: Mean contributions by role and treatment (in percent of endowment) 
  Non-Stakeholder  Stakeholder 








Wilcoxon rank-sum test p value  0.992  0.680 
N = 40 in each cell. Standard deviations in parentheses. 
 
 





























Table 3: Evidence of reciprocal contributions 
  Private  Public 








N  13  11 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-value  0.420  0.058 
N < 40 in each cell because subjects who did not face both “nice” and “mean” Stakeholder were dropped. Standard 
deviations in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4: Correlates of contribution decisions 
Characteristic  Subjects with 
Characteristic 
Treatment  Role  Difference 
Democrat  21 of 40  Public  Stakeholder  Democrats give less  
(88.81 vs. 97.37, p=0.009) 
Risk averse  17 of 40  Private  Non-Stakeholder  Less risk averse give more 
(27.94 vs. 10.07, p=0.026) 
Risk averse  17 of 40  Private  Stakeholder  Less risk averse give less 
(87.65 vs. 98.26, p=0.054 
Comprehension 
question wrong 
6 of 40  Private  Non-Stakeholder  Wrong answer give more 
(42.50 vs. 13.28, p=0.022) 
Comprehension 
question wrong 
6 of 40  Public  Non-Stakeholder  Wrong answer give more 
(35.00 vs. 13.04, p=0.008) 
Amounts given in percent of endowment. P-values are for Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
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